We investigate the concept of quantum secret sharing. In a ((k, n)) threshold scheme, a secret quantum state is divided into n shares such that any k of those shares can be used to reconstruct the secret, but any set of k − 1 or fewer shares contains absolutely no information about the secret. We show that the only constraint on the existence of threshold schemes comes from the quantum "no-cloning theorem", which requires that n < 2k, and, in all such cases, we give an efficient construction of a ((k, n)) threshold scheme. We also explore similarities and differences between quantum secret sharing schemes and quantum error-correcting codes. One remarkable difference is that, while most existing quantum codes encode pure states as pure states, quantum secret sharing schemes must use mixed states in some cases. For example, if k ≤ n < 2k − 1 then any ((k, n)) threshold scheme must distribute information that is globally in a mixed state.
Suppose that the president of a bank wants to give access to a vault to three vice presidents who are not entirely trusted. Instead of giving the combination to any one individual, it may be desirable to distribute information in such a way that no vice president alone has any knowledge of the combination, but any two of them can jointly determine the combination. In 1979, Blakely [1] and Shamir [2] addressed a generalization of this problem, by showing how to construct schemes that divide a secret into n shares such that any k of those shares can be used to reconstruct the secret, but any set of k − 1 or fewer shares contains absolutely no information about the secret. This is called a (k, n) threshold scheme, and is a useful tool for designing cryptographic key management systems. Now, consider a generalization of such schemes to the setting of quantum information, where the secret is an arbitrary unknown quantum state. Salvail [3] (see also [4] ) obtained a method to divide an unknown qubit into two shares, each of which individually contains no information about the qubit, but which jointly can be used to reconstruct the qubit. Hillery, Bužek, and Berthiaume [4] proposed a method for implementing some clas-sical threshold schemes that uses quantum information to transmit the shares securely in the presence of eavesdroppers.
Define a ((k, n)) threshold scheme, with k ≤ n, as a method to encode and divide an arbitrary secret quantum state (which is given but not, in general, explicitly known) into n shares with the following two properties. First, from any k or more shares the secret quantum state can be perfectly reconstructed. Second, from any k − 1 or fewer shares, no information at all can be deduced about the secret quantum state. Formally, this means that the reduced density matrix of these k − 1 shares (with the other shares traced out) is independent of the value of the secret. Each share can consist of any number of qubits (or higher-dimensional states), and not all shares need to be of the same size. In this paper we do not consider the problem of securely creating and distributing the shared secret, and simply assume that it can be done when necessary.
Quantum secret sharing schemes might be used in the context of sharing quantum keys, such as those proposed by Weisner [5] for uncounterfeitable "quantum money." They can also be used to provide interesting ways of distributing quantum entanglement and nonlocality. For example, suppose that Alice has one qubit of an EPR pair and a ((2, 2)) threshold scheme is applied to the other qubit to produce a share for Bob and a share for Carol. Then Alice and Bob together have a product state (i.e., ρ AB = ρ A ⊗ ρ B ), as do Alice and Carol; however, Bob and Carol can jointly construct a qubit from their shares that is in an EPR state with Alice's qubit. Also, for quantum storage or quantum computations to be robust in the worst-case situation where a component or a group of components fail (due to sabotage by malicious parties or due to defects), quantum secret sharing may prove to be a useful concept. Finally, by definition, quantum secret sharing distributes trust between various parties and prevents a small coalition of malicious parties from learning a quantum secret.
Let us begin with an example of a ((2, 3)) threshold scheme. The secret here is an arbitrary three-dimensional quantum state (a quantum trit or qutrit). The encoding maps the secret qutrit to three qutrits as
and each resulting qutrit is taken as a share. Note that, from a single share, absolutely no information can be deduced about the secret, since each individual share is always in the totally mixed state (an equal mixture of |0 , |1 , and |2 ). On the other hand, the secret can be reconstructed from any two of the three shares as follows. If we are given the first two shares (for instance), add the value of the first share to the second (modulo three), and then add the value of the second share to the first, to obtain the state
The first qutrit now contains the secret. The reconstruction procedure for the other cases is similar, by the symmetry of mapping (1) with respect to cyclic permutations of the three qutrits. Note that, because the data is quantum, one must be careful not to individually measure the shares while performing the reconstruction, since this will collapse any superposition of the basis states. The same considerations arise with quantum error-correcting codes [6, 7] . In fact, the above example is a three-qutrit quantum code that can correct one erasure error. Every quantum secret sharing scheme is, in some sense, a quantum errorcorrecting code; however, some error-correcting codes are not secret sharing schemes, since they may contain sets of shares from which partial information about the secret can be obtained. For example, consider a four-qubit code [8, 9] that corrects one erasure by the encoding α |0 + β |1 −→ α(|0000 + |1111 ) + β(|0011 + |1100 ) (the code can actually be extended to encode two qubits, but we do not need this for our illustration). While it is true that any three qubits suffice to reconstruct the secret, it is not true that two qubits provide no information. For instance, given the first and third qubits, one can distinguish between the secrets |0 and |1 . More generally, from these two qubits, statistical information about the relative values of |α| and |β| can be obtained. Later, we shall show how to obtain a ((3, 4)) threshold scheme with four qubits using a different approach.
Returning to the ((2, 3)) threshold scheme using qutrits, note that it can be used to share a secret that is a qubit by simply not using the third dimension of the input space (though the resulting shares are still full qutrits). It turns out that there does not exist a ((2, 3)) threshold scheme for qubits in which each share is also a qubit. This is because such a scheme would also be a three-qubit code that corrects single qubit erasure errors, which has been shown not to exist [9] .
The ((2, 3)) qutrit threshold scheme can be used to construct a ((2, 2)) threshold scheme, by simply discarding (i.e., tracing out) one of the three shares. Note that the resulting ((2, 2)) scheme produces a mixed state encoding even when the secret is a pure state. The encoding procedure can be defined by the following linear map on density matrices
Call a scheme that encodes pure state secrets using global pure states a pure state scheme, and a scheme for which the encodings of pure states are sometimes in global mixed states a mixed state scheme. We shall show later that there does not exist a pure state ((2, 2)) threshold scheme.
On the other hand, if we do not insist on protecting an arbitrary secret, we could use the encoding
For the restricted set of secrets where α · β * is realvalued, it functions as a ( (2, 2)) threshold scheme. However, without this restriction, this is not a secret sharing scheme, since (for example) it can be verified that a single share can completely distinguish between the secrets |0 + i |1 and |0 − i |1 . Although such a scheme may be useful in some contexts, we shall henceforth consider only "unrestricted" secret sharing schemes.
Note that the previously mentioned technique of discarding a share from a ((2, 3)) threshold scheme to obtain a ((2, 2)) threshold scheme (suggested by [10] in the context of a different scheme) generalizes considerably: Theorem 1. From any ((k, n)) threshold scheme with n > k, a ((k, n − 1)) threshold scheme can be constructed by discarding one share.
In the classical case, a (k, n) threshold scheme exists for every value of n ≥ k. However, this does not hold in the quantum case, due to the quantum "no-cloning theorem" [11, 12] , which states that no operation can produce multiple copies of an unknown arbitrary quantum state. Theorem 2. If n ≥ 2k then no ((k, n)) threshold scheme exists. Proof. If a ((k, n)) threshold scheme exists with n ≥ 2k then the following procedure can be used to make two independent copies of an arbitrary quantum state (that is, to clone). First, apply the ((k, n)) scheme to the state to produce n shares. Then, taking two disjoint sets of k shares, reconstruct two independent copies of the state. This contradicts the "no-cloning theorem" [11, 12] .
2 The five-qubit quantum code proposed in [13, 14] immediately yields a ((3, 5)) threshold scheme. First, since it corrects any two erasure errors, it enables the secret to be reconstructed from any three shares. Also, any pair of qubits provides no information about the data. This is a consequence of the following more general theorem. Theorem 3. If a quantum code with codewords of length 2k − 1 corrects k − 1 erasure errors (which, for stabilizer codes [15, 16] ((k, 2k − 1) ) threshold scheme.
Proof. First, suppose that we are given a set of k shares. Since this set excludes precisely k − 1 shares and the code corrects any k − 1 erasures, the secret can be reconstructed from these k shares. On the other hand, suppose that we are given a set of k − 1 shares. This subset excludes a set of k shares, from which we know that the secret can be perfectly reconstructed. Now, in quantum mechanics, it is well-known that any information gain on an unknown quantum state necessarily leads to its disturbance [17] . n) ) threshold scheme can be constructed for any n < 2k.
For example, from the aforementioned five-qubit code, a ((3, 4)) threshold scheme and ((3, 3)) threshold scheme can be obtained (by discarding shares).
Next, we prove the converse of Theorem 2.
Theorem 5. If n < 2k, then a ((k, n)) threshold scheme exists. Moreover, the dimension of each share can be bounded above by 2 max(2k − 1, s), where s is the dimension of the quantum secret.
Proof. The proof is based on a class of quantum polynomial codes, which are similar to those defined by Aharonov and Ben-Or [18] , who used them in the context of fault-tolerant quantum computation. We will show how to construct such a code of length m and degree k −1 whenever m < 2k, and that the data that it encodes can always be recovered from any k of its m coordinates. Then, considering the special case where m = 2k − 1, we obtain a [[2k − 1, 1, k]] q code, for which Corollary 4 applies to prove the theorem. Let k and m be given with m < 2k, and let s be the dimension of the quantum state to be encoded. Choose a prime q such that max(m, s) ≤ q ≤ 2 max(m, s) (which is always possible [19] ) and let F = Z q . For c = (c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c k−1 ) ∈ F k , define the polynomial p c (t) = c 0 + c 1 t + · · · + c k−1 t k−1 . Let x 0 , . . . , x m−1 be m distinct elements of F. Encode a q-ary quantum state by the linear mapping which is defined on basis states |s (for s ∈ F) as |s → 
As an example, it turns out that mapping (1) (for the ((2, 3)) threshold scheme given at the beginning of this paper) is a quantum polynomial code with k = 2, m = 3, and q = 3.
It now suffices to show that, given an encoding (5) of a quantum state, the state can be recovered from any k of the m coordinates. One way to show this is to apply the theory of CSS codes [20, 21] , noting that this code is formed from the two classical codes
and that min(dist C 1 , dist C ⊥ 2 ) = m − k + 1. From this it follows that the code corrects m − k erasure errors.
For completeness, we also give an explicit decoding procedure for the case of interest, where m = 2k − 1. We begin with some preliminary definitions. The secret can be recovered from any k coordinates by the following procedure. Call the m registers containing the coordinates R 0 , . . . , R m−1 , and suppose that we are given, say, the first k registers (that is, R 0 , . . . , R k−1 ).
Apply
2. Cyclically shift the first k registers by one to the right by setting (R 0 , R 1 . . . , R k−1 ) to
Consider an execution of the above procedure on a state resulting from the encoding (5) on a basis state |s . After steps 1 and 2, the state of the n registers is
If the data is a basis state |s (for some s ∈ F) then, at this point, its recovery is complete. However, for a general secret, which is a superposition of |s states, register R 0 is entangled with the other registers. The entanglement is due to the fact that, in (10), the value of s can be determined by the value of any of the kets |c 0 , . . . , c k−2 |p c (x k ), . . . , p c (x m−1 ) . In fact, if we had m ≥ 2k then s could be determined from just the state of the last m − k registers, so it would be impossible to perform the necessary disentanglement by accessing only the first k registers. Since m = 2k − 1, this is not a problem and the remaining steps correctly extract the data in the following manner.
After steps 3 and 4, the state is
where the last equality holds since, for any s ∈ F and y 1 , . . . , y k−1 ∈ F, there is a unique c ∈ F k with c k−1 = s such that p c (x k+i−1 ) = y i , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k−1}. Since the state of R 1 , . . . , R m−1 is now independent of s, the decoding procedure is now correct for arbitrary data. 2
Although we have focused on threshold schemes, it is possible to consider more general access structures. In a general quantum secret sharing scheme, from certain authorized sets of shares, the secret can be reconstructed, while, from all other sets of shares, no information can be obtained about the secret. Those other sets are called unauthorized sets. For example, consider a scenario with three shares, A, B, C, where the authorized sets are {A, B}, {A, C}, and any superset of one of these sets. Such a secret sharing scheme can be easily implemented by starting with the ( (3, 4) ) threshold scheme and bundling the first two shares into the share A.
We have already seen relationships between quantum secret sharing schemes and quantum error-correcting codes. We now explore this connection more deeply.
The following proposition follows naturally from the usual formulation of the conditions for a quantum errorcorrecting code. 
for all operators E acting on K.
c) For all (normalized) |φ ∈ C and all E acting on K,
Note that the same function c(E) appears in conditions (b) and (c), and that it is independent of |φ or |φ i .
Proof. a) ⇔ b) is essentially the standard quantum error correction conditions [13, 23] applied to erasure errors [9] . b) ⇔ c) is straightforward. Alternately, a) ⇔ c) follows from the main theorem of [22] .
2 Equation (12) says that in correcting errors, we will never confuse two different basis vectors. Equation (13) says that learning about the error will never give us any information about which basis vector we have. This is important, since that information would constitute a measurement, collapsing a superposition of basis vectors.
On the other hand, condition (14) simply says that the environment can never gain any information about the state. In other words, the proposition tells us that protecting a state from noise is exactly the same as preventing the environment from learning about it.
Condition (14) is also very convenient for our purposes, since the two constraints that arise on a quantum secret sharing scheme are the ability to correct erasures and the requirement that no information be gained by unauthorized sets of shares.
In the theory of quantum error-correcting codes, we usually consider shares of the same dimension. In contrast, in quantum secret sharing, we would like to allow shares to live in Hilbert spaces of different sizes. Nevertheless, it is still true that conditions a), b), and c) in Proposition 6 are equivalent.
Theorem 7. An encoding f : |ψ → |φ is a pure state quantum secret sharing scheme iff
(independent of |φ ) whenever E is an operator acting on the complement of an authorized set or when E is an operator acting on an unauthorized set.
For instance, for the three-qutrit scheme (1) and E j |y 1 , y 2 , y 3 = ω yj |y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , where ω = exp(2πi/3), we have φ|E j |φ = 0 for all states |φ used in the scheme.
Proof. Let C be the image of f . S is an authorized set iff the subspace C can correct for erasures on K, the complement of S. By Proposition 6, this means S is an authorized set iff (15) holds for all E acting on K. T is an unauthorized set whenever we can gain no information about the state |ψ from any measurement on T . That is, the expectation value φ|E|φ is independent of |φ ∈ C for any operator E we could choose to measure, which means it must act on T . Again, this is condition (15 Proof. If the complement of an authorized set of shares S 1 were another authorized set S 2 then we could create two copies of the secret from S 1 and S 2 , violating the no-cloning theorem. Therefore, the complement of an authorized set is always an unauthorized set. On the other hand, by Proposition 6, if condition (15) holds on an unauthorized set T , we can correct erasures on T , and therefore reconstruct the secret on the complement of T . Therefore, the complement of an unauthorized set is always an authorized set.
2 For a pure state ((k, n)) threshold scheme, this condition implies that n − k = k − 1. Therefore: Corollary 9. Any ((k, n) ) pure state threshold scheme satisfies n = 2k − 1.
Clearly, this corollary does not apply to mixed state schemes, since we have constructed ((k, n)) threshold schemes with n < 2k − 1.
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